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Agent Research Environments:到底在测什么

Jul 2026 · AutoResearch / Eval Environments / World Models / Synthetic Training / Browser Use / Computer Use

MLS-Bench、AutoLab、EdgeBench、Terminal-Bench、SForge 和 Harbor 经常被一起叫作“agent benchmark”。这会遮住最关键的区别:有些定义任务,有些运行任务,有些保护隐藏评分,有些研究长程反馈如何改变工件。它们不在同一条能力尺子上,分数也不应该直接横比。本文进一步把两件事放进同一张地图:当环境由 world model 合成时,如何区分逼真画面与可验证的状态转移;当环境被用来生产合成训练实例时,如何让这些实例可执行、可审计、可迁移。

先问四个问题:agent 对什么工件负责?有多长的交互时间?能收到什么反馈?最终由哪个验证器判分?答案不同,测到的能力就不同。

1. 不是一个排行榜,而是一张测量地图

名称与状态 主要工件与时程 主要信号 最接近的推断
MLS-Bench · 已发布 benchmark 受保护 scaffold 中的原子 ML 方法组件;有界 edit/test 预算 多设置、跨种子的受限实验结果 方法是否跨设置迁移,而非单数据集调参
AutoLab · 已发布 benchmark 正确但刻意次优的可执行基线;2–12 小时 本地试验 + 密封 held-out verifier 是否能持续进行经验优化
EdgeBench · 已发布但部分公开 真实感工作区内逐步改善的工件;每题至少 12 小时 快速本地反馈、提交后 hidden judge、未反馈快照 环境反馈如何在一段连续运行中变成进步曲线
Terminal-Bench 2.x · 已发布 benchmark 终端中可接受的最终容器状态 测试检查最终状态 能否完成规定的计算机工作
Terminal-Bench 3.0 · 建设中 preview / 候选 terminal 工作 计划中的程序验证 目标不是已发布的分数或固定任务集
Terminal-Bench Science · 建设中 自然科学计算工作流 项目要求确定性 pytest 验证 可靠完成可程序验证的科学任务,不是开放式发现
SForge · harness EdgeBench 的 work 状态、提交与轨迹 work/judge 分离的异步 structured feedback 长程隐藏评测是否被严谨地执行
Harbor · harness task、trial、job 与产生的 artifacts task 自定义 verifier 和数值 reward 可复放、可扩展的 agent eval / RL rollout 基础设施
状态边界:EdgeBench 公布了 134 个任务和完整评测框架,但首发公开 51 个任务;不应把全量榜单写成完全可独立复现。TB3 与 Terminal-Bench Science 目前都在建设,目标任务数和目标解题率是计划,不是已实现的 leaderboard 事实。

2. 科学任务的四种不同主张

“scientific task”不是一个统一对象。下面四种主张需要不同证据:

主张 代表环境 需要看什么
工作流完成 Terminal-Bench 2.x / Terminal-Bench Science 可验证的最终文件、数值结果或服务状态
持续的经验优化 AutoLab 在固定预算内反复基准测试、修改并改善已知基线
方法级泛化 MLS-Bench 同一个 ML 机制能否跨设置成立,而非靠放大模型或单点调参
环境学习动态 EdgeBench 在至少 12 小时的连续经验中,best-so-far 工件如何随反馈改善

EdgeBench 的 Scientific Problems & ML 有 39 个任务;许多问题开放且没有已知最优解,但这不表示每个任务都没有可评分成分。官方描述的是本地模拟、验证与物理约束,加上隔离 judge 的反馈。论文的 log-sigmoid 是跨任务平均曲线的作者报告,不能写成“每个科学任务都服从同一条平滑曲线”。

Terminal-Bench Science 的边界几乎相反:征集要求科学工作流能被确定性、pytest 形式的程序化评测验证,并明确排除开放式假设生成和文献综述。它适合测“能否完成一个被规定的科学计算工作”,不直接测“能否提出新的科学理论”。

发布状态决定今天可以说什么

  1. EdgeBench 的 Scientific Problems & ML。项目描述 39 个科学与 ML 任务,但首发公开的是其中 4 个。它们允许从实验误差、约束违例和物理一致性检查中持续获得反馈,因此最直接支持的是:在固定任务、harness 和时间窗内,agent 的 best-so-far 工件如何随环境反馈改变。它不让我们把全量科学子集说成完全公开可复现的 benchmark,也不等于 agent 已经完成开放式科学发现。
  2. Terminal-Bench Science。状态页 当前显示 0 个任务并标为建设中;征集公告的 100+ 任务和 10–20% 解题率是目标。今天它能支撑的是一套任务贡献与确定性验证标准,不是科学 leaderboard 结果。发布后,它的核心主张仍是可验证工作流完成,而不是环境学习曲线或假说生成。
  3. Terminal-Bench 3.0。同样处于建设阶段。贡献、审查和任务格式说明了一个未来 terminal benchmark 的质量门槛;在固定任务集和正式结果出现前,不能把 preview 或目标数字当作可比较的能力分数。
  4. Frontier Auto Research / ART。这是我们的拟议研究范围,不是已发布 benchmark。它若使用科学任务,需要额外要求一个研究证据包:可复跑工件、对照与消融、失败记录、资源账本,以及未参与选择的迁移或复现。这样才能把“完成 workflow”或“沿反馈曲线提高”与“提出可发表的经验结论”分开报告。

这里的关键不是谁的任务更“科学”,而是哪个对象被固定、哪个反馈可见、哪个 verifier 有写权限,以及在什么发布状态下可以复查结论。所有来源及不应外推的结论见研究证据地图

3. SForge 和 Harbor:它们不是两个 benchmark

SForge 是 EdgeBench 的长程评测 harness。每个任务可以有 agent 可见的 work 镜像与隐藏 judge 镜像;agent 打包提交,Judge Server 异步返回任务定义的反馈,评测可从整条轨迹中选择最佳提交。隐藏测试、提交次数和 feedback 协议属于其设计的一部分。

Harbor 是更通用的智能体运行支架:Dataset -> Task -> Trial -> Job。任务用 instruction、环境、测试和可选 oracle 描述;verifier 写出 reward.txtreward.json,agent adapter 与 sandbox 可以替换。它是 Terminal-Bench 2.0 的官方 harness,但 Harbor 本身不声称在测“科学能力”。

协议问题 SForge 的默认取向 Harbor 的默认取向
隐藏判分 work / judge 分离是核心设计 可共享 verifier,也可显式启用 separate verifier
反馈循环 多次 archive submission、队列、结构化诊断与轨迹最佳值 task 在 trial 结束后由 verifier 产生 reward;形状由任务作者决定
主要用途 观察超长程、反馈驱动的工件改进 通用 eval、可移植轨迹与 RL rollouts

这是一张协议对照表,不是性能对照表。没有固定同一模型、任务、资源、网络策略和 verifier 的实验,不能断言谁更快、更可靠或“更强”。

4. Terminal、Browser Use 与 Computer Use:接口边界也会改变测量

接口 真实状态在哪里 一个动作能证明什么 应如何验证
Terminal / 科学计算 容器文件系统、进程与内核 命令已运行,stdout / exit status 可记录 固定输入、镜像 digest、测试和产物复跑
Browser Use(浏览器操作) 页面、Cookie、标签页和远端服务 click / fill 交互可送达 回执、记录 ID、用户可见状态或安全的只读后端核验
Computer Use(计算机操作) GUI、窗口、桌面软件和其背后状态 截图驱动的鼠标 / 键盘动作已执行 重新观察,优先使用确定性的终态断言

Browser Use 不是“带按钮的 terminal”。它可以保留 session、Cookie 和标签页,也可通过 CDP、页面检查、JavaScript 或截图工作;界面轨迹不一定看得到服务端完整业务状态。Playwright 在点击前检查元素可见、稳定、可接收事件,但这不证明订单已创建或邮件已发送。

Computer Use 的边界更大:以 OpenAI 的 computer tool 为例,模型看截图、输出鼠标键盘等动作、再接收新截图。它可以驱动浏览器、VM 或桌面式 harness;每轮同时带来推理、渲染、截图传输和视觉 token 成本。两者的差别不应简化成“视觉 vs DOM”,而是通用计算机执行环境 vs 浏览器运行时

安全边界:网页和屏幕内容都是不可信输入。对认证、支付、权限变更、发送或删除等不可逆动作,应使用隔离 session、域名与动作 allowlist、终态验证,并在风险点请求人工确认。最终截图是证据,不是交易成功的保证。

对 self-host 网页、企业网页、live web、桌面和移动环境的任务基底、reset、接口、verifier 与可比 profile 的完整对照,见网页 Agent 环境;不要把它们的成功率混成单一“通用 GUI”分数。

5. World Models 作为环境:从逼真画面到可验证的状态转移

当我们用生成式 world model 去合成任务环境时,“world model”这个词正在同时指代四个不同对象:预测器、视频或模拟器、具身任务环境,以及 agent 为规划维护的内部状态。它们相关,却不是同一个研究对象。对 RSI、Auto Research、long horizon、RL environment 与合成实例训练而言,关键不在于画面多真实,而在于能否回答:一个动作在何种状态下被允许,它改变了什么,失败怎样发生,如何恢复,以及谁独立检查终态。

中心命题:visual plausibility != interactive utility != correct state transition != verified outcome。只有把这四层分开,world model 才能成为可训练、可审计、可推翻的 environment,而不是一段看起来连贯的 rollout。

5.1 先分清四个容易混写的对象

对象 它要回答什么 可成立的最窄结论 不能据此推出
World representation / predictor 下一观察、隐藏状态或不确定性如何随动作变化? 在给定分布和动作条件下,预测误差或校准可以被测量 模型已理解因果世界,或能可靠控制真实系统
Generative simulation 能否生成看起来连续的图像、视频或传感器轨迹? 感知呈现可被比较 渲染逼真即表示动作语义或后置条件正确
Executable environment 初态、动作、转移、错误与 reset 如何运行? 特定接口上的任务可以重放、训练和验证 环境没有漏洞、分布偏差或 reward shortcut
Agent-maintained state agent 如何记住已发生的动作、对象状态和未决约束? state reconstruction、检索和恢复可以被单独测量 有 memory 就具备长程规划或可靠执行

WorldArena 明确把感知质量与功能性交互效用放在同一评测框架中比较;其后续 WorldArena 2.0 将范围延伸到 visuotactile 与 interactive-RL 设置。这些预印本支持一个朴素但重要的设计规则:视觉质量和交互效用必须分别报告,而不是让前者替后者背书。

5.2 从“像不像”到“能不能做对”:四层验收

WorldArena 围绕可交互的具身 world model 组织感知、功能和 action-planning 评估,并强调视觉表现与实用交互能力可能脱钩。iWorld-Bench 则以 interaction 为中心,分别考察 action-conditioned world modeling 的多个任务类型。它们的共同价值不是给出一个普适排名,而是迫使评测者明确自己在测哪一层。

验收层 一个可观测指标 必须有的反例 不足以作为证据
呈现 / perception 视觉、触觉或文本观察是否与参考匹配 画面正确但 hidden backend state 错误 视频流畅、截图相似、主观觉得真实
动作条件预测 给定 (state, action),下一观察与状态变化是否校准 预测看似合理但关键 postcondition 不成立 不带动作的生成质量、平均像素分数
交互效用 / policy utility 固定 policy 在模拟与目标环境的 verified success、错误和恢复是否一致 模拟中成功、真实/独立环境中失败 单条 rollout、未检查的 action success
终态验收 / acceptance 独立 verifier 是否确认业务或物理后置条件 UI 显示完成但请求未提交;endpoint 到达但 payload 错误 agent 的 final text、toast、URL 或截图

对 web、terminal、科学任务或 computer-use 环境,最后一层通常比画面更直接:订单是否真的写入、文件内容和测试是否正确、实验工件是否能重跑、设备状态是否符合规格。渲染可以是 observation;它不是 ground truth。将“visual score 较高”写成“环境可靠”,是一个没有被 verifier 覆盖的跳跃。

5.3 一个可训练 environment 需要什么 contract

一个训练用环境至少应把下列对象独立版本化,而不是把规则隐在 prompt、页面脚本或唯一的 reward number 中:

TaskManifest  = goal, initial_state_digest, allowed_actions, budget, seed
Observe        = state -> observation + observation_provenance
Act            = (state, authorized_action) -> transition_event | rejected_action
Transition     = (state, action, exogenous_event) -> next_state + side_effect_digest
Reset          = task_id, seed -> initial_state + reset_evidence
Verify         = hidden_postcondition(next_state, evidence) -> outcome + diagnostics
Recover        = checkpoint, failure -> restored_state | safe_stop

这个 contract 有七个实务含义:

  1. 初态是数据,不是背景。 为每次 run 记录 image/database/VM digest、account/fixture、seed 和 reset 证据。
  2. 动作权限先于动作空间。 schema 说明 agent 能表达什么;capability grant 决定它此刻能否读、写、调用外部服务或产生不可逆副作用。
  3. 转移要有可核验的后果。 action 的成功返回不能覆盖后端写入、文件落盘、物体状态改变或失败分支。
  4. 观察不等于真值。 DOM、屏幕、tool response 和 agent memory 都可能陈旧、被注入或不完整;保留其 provenance 和可见性范围。
  5. reward 与 verifier 分离。 reward 可以是学习信号;最终 acceptance 仍需由 agent 不可写的 verifier 和隐藏 postcondition 决定。
  6. reset 与 recovery 分开测。 reset 复原一个标准初态;recovery 从中断、错误或部分副作用中恢复并保留证据。两者都不能由聊天摘要替代。
  7. 轨迹是证据,不是裁决。 记录 action、拦截、状态变更、cost、checkpoint 和 artifact hash,但只让独立 verifier 判定终态。

OSWorld 将可执行的 computer environment、VM snapshot 和执行评测放到一起,是这类 contract 的早期具体形态;EnvFactoryAgentick 则把环境/任务合成与可验证任务设计推进为可研究的系统问题。它们不保证任一环境天然安全或无污染,但说明任务、状态、执行和验证必须同时成为工程对象。

5.4 合成世界不是合成文案:生成器也要接受隔离

当合成实例被拿来训练时,最危险的缩减是只生成 task instruction 或成功轨迹。一个有训练价值的合成实例应至少包含:

实例部分 最小要求 它保护什么
初态与角色 snapshot/fixture、身份、seed、可见信息与隐藏信息的边界 防止 agent 从模板记住唯一答案
状态机 precondition、authorized action、transition、failure branch、terminal condition 防止环境只奖励一条理想轨迹
观测与证据 DOM/screen/tool/file/database observation 的来源与时间 防止把可见表象当作真实状态
verifier 独立 postcondition、审计输入、版本/hash、诊断 防止 policy 改写或猜中 reward shortcut
谱系与 split generator、prompt/template、source、版本、训练归属、evaluation exclusion 防止生成器、任务规则或成功轨迹泄漏到 holdout

Agent World Model 提出用代码和数据库支撑的合成 tool environment;它在自己定义的环境和评测中报告结果,因而支持“可执行、状态化合成环境是可行研究对象”,却不证明自动生成的世界会自然覆盖真实工具生态。Agent-World 研究从数据库/工具环境中发现并扩展任务,也同样应按其任务、工具、训练与评测分布来读。

因此训练/评测至少做四重分离:按 environment、workflow/rule、generator/template family 和 evaluator/security family 切分。生成器曾见过 verifier 逻辑、评测成功轨迹或唯一的 state template 时,即使任务名称不同,也不能再把最终分数当作干净的 transfer 证据。详细的实例谱系、SFT/RL 对照和 split 协议见第 8 节。

5.5 Long horizon 的核心不是更长视频,而是可恢复状态

WorldLines 从家庭协助的长时 trace 构造 memory QA 与具身规划样本,其中包含对话、动作、执行反馈以及对象/设备状态变化,并特别暴露 partial observability、状态覆盖和把记忆转成行动计划的困难。LongAct 以自由文本家庭任务考察依赖、记忆和适应性计划。二者的直接启示是:长程 environment 需要让 agent 面对 state change,而不是把每一步重新包装成彼此独立的问答。

最小的 long-horizon 评测应报告:

  • state reconstruction: 中断后能否在不暴露隐藏真值的情况下恢复已提交/未提交、资源和约束;
  • uncertainty 与观测范围: agent 是否知道某个对象或状态是不可见、已过期或被覆盖的;
  • failure recovery: tool error、网络失败、冲突写入或部分提交后,是否选择重试、回滚、升级或安全停止;
  • verified completion: 最终 postcondition 是否成立,而不是 episode 是否耗尽或文本是否自信;
  • cost of recovery: 恢复使用的 token、工具调用、wall-clock 和额外副作用。

这也是 world model 与 long-horizon harness 的交点:一个内部预测或 memory 只有在面对状态被覆盖、观察不完整和 action feedback 时仍帮助正确恢复,才值得被称作有用。更完整的 checkpoint、故障注入和验收规则见长程 Agent;context、event、retrieval、execution state 与 memory trust boundary 的独立协议见Agent Memory

5.6 Foundation World Models 是研究纲领,不是已经验证的系统保证

Foundation World Models 提出一个有启发性的研究纲领:由 specification 派生 reward、以形式验证校验约束、在线校准抽象,并在 test time 合成模型或环境。它非常适合帮助我们列出变量,却不应被写成已得到验证的通用能力或安全保证。

将这个纲领落到可证伪实验时,至少应把下列问题分开:

倡议 可测试实现 推翻或收缩它的观察
specification-derived reward 由明确 postcondition 生成的中间信号,与独立终态分开报告 reward 增长但 hidden verifier 不增,或 policy 学会篡改其输入
formal constraints 对 action、资源、状态不变量做可执行检查 约束只覆盖理想路径,失败分支仍能越权或产生错误副作用
online calibration 报告预测置信度、失配检测、何时请求观察或安全停止 高置信度错误、分布外状态不被识别,或校准只在开发环境成立
test-time synthesis 在冻结 holdout 外生成 helper model/environment,并记录来源 生成器接触最终规则、hidden evaluator 或成功轨迹,导致评测泄漏

这条边界对 Auto Research 与 RSI 尤其重要:系统可以提出或合成一个更好的研究/环境工件,但 candidate 不应写 acceptance、policy 或 credential;独立 evaluator 也不能被“world model 很像真的”所替代。

5.7 一个最小、但足够尖锐的评测矩阵

如果要比较静态数据、视觉 world model、可执行 environment 和 agent-maintained state,建议固定 base model、harness、action authority、总 token、wall-clock、训练数据预算与 hidden evaluator,并加入下列配对反例:

对照 需要测量 真正有信息量的失败
static trace vs executable transition verified success、重放、OOD transition error 只会复述成功轨迹,无法处理合法但未见的状态变化
visually plausible vs state-correct simulator action-conditioned accuracy、postcondition violation 外观正确却提交到错误对象、写错字段或改变错误设备
reward-only vs independent verifier reward/verified-success gap、tampering、false acceptance 分数高但后端没变,或 agent 改写证据/评分输入
no-memory vs recoverable state reconstruction、recovery、rollback、安全停止 摘要听起来合理却遗漏已提交操作或旧约束
synthetic train vs split-isolated evaluation environment/workflow/template/security-family transfer 更换 generator、规则或 evaluator 后收益消失

报告不应只含一个 pass rate。最低限度还包括 transition violation、错误/拒绝/恢复类型、interception 或 authority violation、uncertainty calibration、trace completeness、cost per verified success 和跨 seed/任务的方差。对于有真实副作用的 browser/computer task,还应明确控制平面和 sidecar evidence;参见Agent Tool Governance

5.8 回到五条核心研究线

核心线 World-model / environment 新增的可测对象 不能替代什么
RSI / OpenRSI 可编辑的 state/harness/world artifact、跨代 transition regression、不可写 acceptance 改进改进者在独立 holdout 上持续变好的证据
Auto Research / ART 研究状态、实验转移、失败分支、可重跑 postcondition 因果有效性、对照、局限和同行检验
Long horizon 可见性、状态谱系、checkpoint、recovery 和 safe stop 只因 episode 变长而得到的能力结论
ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench self-host snapshot、授权动作、后端状态与独立 verifier 浏览器画面、click trace 或 endpoint 成功本身
Synthetic training / Agentic RL 可执行实例、transition coverage、generator provenance 和 split-isolated transfer 一批合成文本或提升的开发集 reward

结论不复杂,却很有约束力:world model 不是为环境披上一层更漂亮的皮,而是让环境的状态、转移、观察、权限、恢复和验收变得可定义、可干预、可反驳。这样它才能同时服务 RL 训练、长程执行、合成数据和研究型 agent,而不让“看起来真实”悄悄替代“被独立验证为正确”。

6. 我们如何做出区分:证据保持型研究智能体

我的研究定位不是再造一个把所有任务压成单分数的 benchmark,而是研究evidence-preserving research agency:一个 agent 只有在产生可复用工件、利用经验反馈改善、通过保留迁移、并能在受控重跑中复现时,才展示了相应层级的研究能力。

这可以作为一个可执行的研究协议:

  1. 用 Harbor 风格 task / artifact / trajectory 记录来保证可复放;
  2. 从 AutoLab 风格的有效基线出发,报告相对质量增益而不是只报绝对分数;
  3. 用 MLS-Bench 风格的受保护编辑面与保留设置检查方法泛化;
  4. 用 EdgeBench 风格的本地与 judge 反馈时间线,记录何时、为何出现真正改善;
  5. 最终报告四维 profile:完成率、相对质量增益、保留迁移、到首次可靠改善的时间 / 重跑一致性

这是一项拟议研究方法,而不是某个已发布系统的性能声明。它的价值在于让“能做 research”变成一组可反驳的证据,而不是一个模糊标签。

7. 评测环境也是训练 substrate,但三种分布必须分开

如果环境要支持合成实例、agentic RL 或持续适应,它不再只是一次性评测器,而是训练 substrate。这里最容易犯的错误是让 task generator、训练 rollout 与最终 verifier 共用同一条答案通道。正确做法是把三种分布明确分开。

Agentick 展示了 procedurally generated task、Gym-compatible 接口、参考策略和预构建训练数据可以被放进同一 sequential-decision framework;它不证明这些合成任务就足够真实。OSWorld 展示了初态配置与 execution-based evaluation 如何让真实计算机任务可重复;它不让 GUI 截图取代终态验证。ACuRL 把目标环境探索、curriculum synthesis 与持续适应关联起来;它的受限结果也不允许训练数据和最终 benchmark 混用。加上 Hack-Verifiable Environments 的可检测漏洞机会,四者共同给出一个训练环境应有的最小边界。

分布 可以包含什么 绝不能借给另一侧什么
Experience / training 可 reset 的站点或 VM、来源可追踪的合成实例、执行轨迹、可见反馈与 curriculum 最终 task、hidden rule、成功 trace 或 evaluator implementation
Evaluation 冻结初态、独立 verifier、按网站 / workflow / 规则隔离的 holdout 用于生成或筛选训练实例的答案、模板或 reward shortcut
Integrity / adversarial 注入、错误 payload、UI/后端不一致、可检测 reward-hacking 机会 对 agent 暴露 hidden judge、特权凭据或针对某个模型的答案钥匙

“学习”必须说明更新通道

“agent 从环境学习”不是一个单一的技术事实。它至少可能指下表中四种不同更新;报告必须写出到底哪一个对象变了,不能从一个通道的正结果跳到另一个通道的结论。

更新通道 实际被更新的对象 可用的代表与最低证据 不能升级成的说法
运行内工件搜索 固定 agent 周围的代码、配置、工作区或 best-so-far artifact AutoLabEdgeBench:固定 agent/harness 版本、完整工件谱系、反馈时间线与同预算曲线 基础模型或 policy 参数已经学习,或结果会离开该任务自动迁移
冻结 policy 的状态 / skill 演化 prompt、playbook、外部 skill 与 meta-skill;backbone 保持冻结 RSEAMetaSkill-Evolve:冻结 backbone、状态版本、开发/holdout gate 与回退 已做了 RL 训练,或模型权重、evaluator 已递归改进
policy / 参数训练 policy、adapter 或模型参数,以及产生更新的 rollout 分布 ACuRLAgentick:base/最终 checkpoint、行为 policy、reward、rollout、训练数据与独立 evaluation split 对任意新环境已有通用持续学习,或训练本身就是 RSI
跨代改进机制 产生、选择和接纳下一代修改的 operator / harness / skill pipeline 固定可编辑面、等资源的 next-generation held-out gain、rejected branches、完整性与 rollback;详见 RSI 单条 skill、单个 artifact 或一次训练 run 变好就构成强 RSI

不更新基础模型并不使“环境学习”自动失效:如果被改善的对象被明确写成 artifact,运行内反馈曲线仍是有价值的证据。这个分类要求的只是不能静默跨越更新通道。对于拟议的 ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench,状态、skill、policy checkpoint 与环境工件可以都被研究,但它们必须各自版本化、各自隔离训练/验收数据,并分别报告。

因此一个可训练环境至少应版本化 resetobserveactverifyevidence 五个 contract,并为每条 synthetic instance 保存 generator、初态、执行 verifier、来源/许可审查、去重与 split provenance。训练结果要以同预算的 SFT-only、RL-only 和 SFT+RL 对照,在环境/工作流/规则均隔离的 held-out task 上验收;否则“合成实例让基础模型变强”只能说明它学会了生成器附近的捷径。

这不是把所有 benchmark 改造成一个大训练场。它只是要求:当一个评测环境被拿来做训练时,评测完整性、数据谱系和反作弊回归必须随之成为一等对象。与 RSI 的候选/接纳分离相同,训练 agent 不应拥有写入最终 verifier 或其证据通道的能力。相关的 memory、MCP、安全和 skill 选择见Agent 热门方向地图;MCP、Browser/Computer Use 的运行时权限、sidecar evidence 与对抗验收见Agent 工具治理;状态转移、视觉与功能评测的分离以及独立终态验收见上文第 5 节。下一节把这条合成实例路径具体展开。

8. 合成实例与 Agent 训练:可执行、可审计、可迁移

“生成 2K 个合成实例”不是一个训练结论,只是一个规模假设。对会使用工具、网页、终端或 GUI 的 agent,真正有训练价值的实例不是一行 prompt-answer,而是一个可执行、可验证、可追溯的小环境:它说明 agent 从什么初态出发,能做什么,哪些轨迹发生过,什么终态算成功,以及这条数据为什么没有泄漏最终评测的答案。

中心命题:合成数据的规模、效果和安全性必须分开报告。先证明实例能够被执行和独立验证;再报告它的覆盖与多样性;最后才在环境、workflow、规则和 verifier 都隔离的未见任务上检验迁移。没有第三步,“训练变强”通常只是对生成器附近分布的描述。

8.1 一条合成实例至少包含什么

对 agent 而言,训练记录的最小单位不是文本对,而是下面这个版本化对象:

字段 应保存什么 没有它会发生什么
Intent 用户目标、约束和允许的成功范围 模型只学到过度指定的操作序列
Initial state 环境 image、数据库 / 文件 / browser profile、账号模板和随机种子 无法重新执行或判断是否从同一问题开始
Action surface 工具 schema、权限、网络与副作用策略 训练轨迹可能使用测试时不存在或越权的工具
Outcome and evidence 独立 verifier、最终工件、服务端 postcondition、trace 与 artifact hash 用语言自评或截图替代真正完成
Provenance generator / model / prompt / source、许可与敏感数据审查、去重和 split 标签 无法审计泄漏、版权、隐私或模板记忆

这也解释了为什么“更多对话”不等于“更多 agent data”。只要没有初态、动作语义和独立终态,轨迹就很难变成可靠的 SFT 示范或 outcome-RL rollout。

8.2 四类合成路线,四种不同风险

AgentTrek 以网页教程为引导,将文本步骤转成 GUI 目标,并在真实数字环境中尝试执行和评估。它说明 guided replay 可以扩展 GUI 轨迹;它不让教程文本天然变成可训练、可许可、且与评测隔离的数据。

EnvFactory 的路线不同:先从真实资源探索、验证有状态的可执行工具环境,再以 topology-aware 的方式生成自然多轮轨迹。它的贡献是把 environment construction 和 trajectory synthesis 连在一起;其特定 benchmark 增益不自动迁移到网页、GUI 或任意工具协议。

Agentick 代表第三类:用程序化任务、共同的 Gym 接口和参考策略来统一不同 agent 范式。Reinforcement Learning Foundation Models Should Already Be A Thing 进一步提出从合成 MDP prior 预训练 RL foundation model 的议程,并在 held-out tabular MDP 上给出概念验证。这两条路线有利于控制生成分布,但并不凭此证明真实工作流的语义、权限或用户意图被保留。

在代码环境中,SWE-Gym 将自然语言任务、代码库、可执行运行时和单元测试封装为训练实例;R2E-Gym 则以从提交构造测试和反向生成任务描述的方式扩展可执行环境,并分析 execution-based 与 execution-free verifier 的互补与局限。它们说明“有一个可运行测试”不等于所有验证问题都已经解决:环境构造、训练集准入和最终迁移接纳仍需分别记录。

选择规则:教程或网页来源可提供自然 intent;可执行环境提供状态转移与 verifier;程序化生成提供覆盖控制;代码库/测试驱动实例提供可重放的终态。一个成熟数据管线可组合它们,但必须记录每一层如何改变了数据分布,不能把不同来源的证据混称为“真实数据”。

8.3 规模不是唯一刻度:多样性与可执行性先于行数

Beyond Quantity: Trajectory Diversity Scaling 报告,在其固定预算的 code-agent 设置中,增加轨迹多样性比单纯增加数量更有价值。这个结果支持把覆盖、长尾和行动复杂度纳入数据选择;它不是任意领域中“多样性必然优于数量”的定律。

因此一个“2K”计划应在数量之前公布实例仪表板:

  1. 执行率: 从冻结初态能否复跑,verifier 是否通过,失败是环境不稳定还是 agent 行为。
  2. 结构多样性: 网站 / 工具图、目标类型、初态、权限、失败恢复和 action topology 的覆盖,而非只比较 embedding。
  3. 语义多样性: intent 是否只是模板改写,是否包含隐含子目标、约束冲突和需要停止 / 拒绝的任务。
  4. 完整性: 是否出现答案、hidden rule、successful trace、评测器代码或评测数据的可搜索近邻。
  5. 成本与风险: 生成、重放、judge、人工复核、许可证/隐私审查和被拦截的危险动作。

8.4 覆盖格比“随机多样”更可审计

多样性不能只是一句“embedding 距离更大”。EnvFactory 将环境 topology 与多轮轨迹生成相连;SWE-GymR2E-Gym 则把可执行运行时、任务构造和 verifier 放进实例定义。基于这些不同对象,下面是一份本文提出的取样协议,不是对任何一篇论文的通用结果宣称。

CoverageCell(
  environment_family, workflow_or_rule, initial_state_class,
  action_topology, authority_class, failure_or_recovery_mode,
  verifier_family, source_lineage_cluster, split)

CoverageManifest(
  cell_quotas, minimum_tail_quota, accepted_and_rejected_counts,
  replay_and_integrity_rates, near_duplicate_policy,
  heldout_exclusion_rule, allocation_version)
覆盖轴 一个实例必须标注什么 应公布的 coverage / quality 信号 不能用什么替代
环境与 workflow 网站/仓库/工具 schema、规则族与最终 split 每个 environment-workflow cell 的 accepted/rejected 数与 held-out exclusion 只报领域名或总实例数
状态与 action 初态类、action topology、读写/不可逆动作与观察模式 cell 内 replay、完成、重复副作用和 action-length 分布 embedding 多样性或一条成功轨迹
恢复与安全 明确失败、静默失败、冲突、注入、拒绝与 safe-stop 模式 故障/安全 cell 覆盖、误拦截、恢复和未覆盖攻击面 只训练顺利成功的轨迹
证据与 verifier verifier 类型、可见反馈、hidden postcondition 和证据来源 verifier 可区分性、完整性违规、复放稳定性 把 judge 分数、测试结果和最终接纳混为一项
来源与语义 generator/source/template/intent cluster、许可/PII 审查与去重簇 cluster 熵、近重复率、跨 cluster 的 split overlap 只按 prompt 文本去重

对一个 2K 预算,先冻结最终 holdout 的 environment、workflow/rule、verifier 与来源排除轴;再为训练侧格子预先分配最小 tail quota,而不是在看到最终分数后向“有效”模板追加数据。每一格都保存 accepted/rejected 比例及拒绝原因:空格子、过度集中的格子和因安全/重放失败被拒的格子,都是数据结果的一部分。若某格没有可接受实例,应报告 uncovered,而不是以相邻模板静默填满。

只有当 accepted / rejected instance 与上述指标都可查询时,2K 才是可审计的数据目标,而不是宣传数字。

8.5 先接纳实例,再接纳训练结果:两道 gate 不能共用一条成功分数

一条轨迹是否有资格进入训练集,和一次训练是否有资格宣称迁移,是两个不同判断。前者审查的是数据对象;后者审查的是实验主张。通过 verifier 的 trace 可能模板化、近重复或泄漏最终任务;一个训练 run 也可能只在开发集变强。因而,同一条成功轨迹、同一个 reward 或同一个 judge 都不能同时充当两道 gate 的唯一依据。

Gate 决定什么 接纳时必须留存 典型拒绝条件
实例准入 candidate instance / trace 能否进入训练 pool 冻结初态与重放记录、独立 outcome evidence、verifier 与完整性结果、权限检查、source/license/PII 审查、去重 hash 与 split 标签 不能稳定复跑;能绕过 verifier;越权副作用;来源/隐私不清;与 held-out 环境、工作流或 evidence 近重复
训练结果接纳 一个 SFT、RL 或 SFT+RL run 能否宣称 held-out transfer base model、harness、工具、data manifest、预算与候选选择规则;独立 final suite 的 outcome、完整性、恢复、成本与 transfer 记录 只报告训练/开发分数;final suite 被自适应选择;增益来自更强工具或更多预算;成功伴随回归、泄漏或完整性违规

两类记录应可以独立查询、复跑和撤销,例如:

InstanceAdmission(instance_hash, source_state, replay_result,
  outcome_evidence, integrity_result, provenance_review,
  split_label, decision)

TrainingAcceptance(run_hash, base_and_harness, method, data_manifest,
  budget, evaluator_version, holdout_suite, outcome, integrity,
  recovery, cost, transfer, decision)

实例准入可以使用训练侧 verifier 作为一项证据;训练结果接纳必须在冻结、隔离的 final suite 上重新发生。这样的双记录让“为何收录一条数据”和“为何相信一次泛化结果”都可审计,也让任何一侧失败都能否决过强的结论。

8.6 SFT、RL 与 SFT+RL:比较的是学习信号,不是算法口号

SFT 可以让 policy 模仿通过验证的 action sequence;outcome-RL 则通过环境终态鼓励能完成但未必与演示完全相同的轨迹。两者都可能失败:SFT 会继承老师的冗余和模板,RL 会放大 verifier 缺口、稀疏 reward 或无效探索。

SFT Memorizes, RL Generalizes 在其受控文本规则与视觉环境中发现,outcome-based RL 对未见变体的泛化优于单独 SFT,而 SFT 仍有助于稳定 RL 的输出格式。它是一个重要的实验设计提醒,不是“RL 在所有 agent 环境都胜过 SFT”的结论。

条件 训练数据与信号 最小公平对照 必须额外检查
SFT-only 通过 verifier 的轨迹与 action / observation 序列 与其他条件同一 base model、相同训练 token 和相同训练环境 模仿成功轨迹是否只复现模板
RL-only 在线 / 离线 rollout 与独立 outcome reward 同一 action surface、rollout budget、stop rule 与安全 policy reward 是否稀疏、可刷或只在训练初态有效
SFT+RL 先以可验证轨迹建立格式和工具先验,再以 outcome 优化 报告两个阶段各自的数据、budget、checkpoint 和选择规则 SFT 贡献、RL 增益和二者交互能否被消融

任何比较若改变了 harness、可用工具、browser profile、verifier、并发或 token 预算,就不再是仅比较训练方法。它比较的是不同 agent system。

8.7 四重隔离:防止生成器、搜索和 evaluator 共享答案

训练 / 评测分割不能只按随机行切分。对 agent task,至少需要四重隔离:

隔离面 训练侧可见 最终评测必须保持不同
Environment 网站、VM image、服务或数据库快照 新站点、独立 image 或不重合的 backend state
Workflow / rule 已见的工具图、业务规则和 verifier pattern 新的工具组合、约束、failures 和 postconditions
Evidence 合成所需的 source 与执行日志 hidden tests、成功轨迹、答案 / metadata 与 evaluator implementation
Search 为训练采集允许的检索语料 评测期间禁止检索到 benchmark、问题上下文或标签

Search-Time Contamination in Deep Research Agents 说明,即使模型权重没有见过 benchmark,测试时 web retrieval 也可能拿到题目上下文或答案而抬高分数。对合成 agent data,生成阶段和评测阶段都需要记录检索源、禁止域与相似度审计;否则“未见”只是文件名不同。

完整性 task 还应包含可检测的 reward-hacking 机会。Hack-Verifiable Environments 的价值正是在于将这类利用变成可自动判定的 outcome。成功率上升但完整性违规上升,不应被报告为训练改善。

8.8 一个可被推翻的 2K 实例协议

以下是为合成实例基础模型训练提出的研究设计,不是当前已完成的数据集或训练结果:

  1. 先做小型 pilot 与实例准入。 每条 candidate instance 从冻结初态执行,保留生成、执行、verifier 和失败记录。只有通过 provenance、可重放、权限和完整性筛查的实例进入 accepted pool。
  2. 冻结分布。 在训练前声明 environment / workflow / rule / evidence / search split;generator 不能看到 final task 或 evaluator 的答案通道。
  3. 按覆盖取样。 在固定 token 与环境预算下,优先补齐 action topology、恢复模式、拒绝/停止、权限和初态的长尾,而不是复制高分模板。
  4. 完成三条件训练。 SFT-only、RL-only、SFT+RL 使用相同 base model、环境、工具和总资源,保存所有 checkpoint 与失败 rollout。
  5. 再接纳训练结果。 在隔离终态上,由不在 agent 写权限内的 verifier 计算 outcome、integrity violation、cost per verified success、recovery 和跨环境迁移;不以语言 judge 的单一偏好作最终 ground truth。

ACuRL 将环境探索、能力相关 curriculum synthesis 与持续适应连在一起,显示“目标环境中的经验”可以成为 data source。它同样提醒我们:这类 adaptive curriculum 必须与 final evaluation 隔离,否则 agent 只是持续追踪同一个测试分布。

8.9 它如何接回五条核心线

核心线 合成训练必须提供 合成训练绝不能替代
RSI / OpenRSI 版本化 skill / harness edit 的训练与 regression evidence 独立 acceptance gate 与跨代 held-out 曲线
Auto Research / ART 可复跑实例、对照、失败和资源账本 研究新颖性、因果解释和同行评审
Long horizon checkpoint、恢复、状态变更与成本相关的轨迹 真实数小时运行的独立验证
ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench self-hosted 初态、动作、后端 postcondition 和安全回归 真实外部服务的开放权限或 secret
Foundation-model training 可审计的 SFT / RL experience 和 OOD transfer test “规模更大一定更强”的叙述

这也把五条线收回一个简单原则:环境定义什么可被学习,verifier 定义什么算完成,隔离定义什么结果值得相信。候选冻结与独立 rerun 的研究接纳见AutoResearch;reward、evidence、verifier 和 acceptance 不可互相替代的审计见Agent Evaluation Integrity;真实 harness 中的 reward 和轨迹见Agentic RL;stateful instance、memory operation、schema/provenance split 与 memory trust boundary 见Agent Memory;skill-aware data、受控 revision 与 skill/RL 的隔离见Agent Skills;相邻的 memory、MCP 与安全方向见Agent 热门方向地图

9. 每一步都可拦截,不代表每一步都被奖励

对拟议的自托管 ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench 环境而言,“每一步拦截”应是提交前的权限控制,而不是一个模糊的 process reward。ClawBench 的公开 trace bundle 分别保留 recording.mp4requests.jsonlactions.jsonlagent-messages.jsonlinterception.json 与 run metadata,说明浏览器行动、网络请求、agent 消息和拦截判断可以被分别记录;它不证明这些记录已穷尽所有浏览器、操作系统或服务端副作用。

BrowseSafe 表明真实 HTML 中的 prompt injection 可改变浏览器 agent 的实际动作;WASP 则使用隔离环境评测 web-agent hijacking。它们支持把 injection、错误 payload 与 UI/后端不一致放进完整性分布,而不是把安全筛查混进 final score 后就假设风险已经解决。

阶段 非 agent 写入的对象 允许的决定 不允许替代什么
Observe observation_ref、来源/信任标签、pre-state digest 提供受限观测 页面文本不是 verifier instruction 或权限授予
Propose proposed_action、声明目标、预期副作用 agent 提出受限 schema action 提议不等于动作已发生
Intercept authority policy、domain/action allowlist、block/ask/allow reason 提交前允许、阻断、脱敏或请求人类确认 拦截不应泄漏 hidden judge、答案或正确下一步
Commit mediated action、外部 receipt、post-state digest 在受控浏览器/CDP/proxy/VM 平面执行 HTTP 200、DOM 变化或截图不等于用户目标完成
Evidence append-only sidecar trace、artifact/receipt hash 固化可审计事实 agent 自述或可改写 log 不是独立证据
Verify / accept agent-nonwritable final verifier、integrity suite、budget ledger 判定终态、违规、恢复与成本 reward、单次 block 或 judge 偏好不是最终接纳

一个最小的版本化记录可以是:

StepRecord(run_id, step_id, pre_state_digest, observation_ref,
  proposed_action, declared_intent, authority_decision,
  interception_reason, commit_receipt, post_state_digest,
  evidence_refs, integrity_label)

RunAcceptance(run_id, task_manifest, harness_and_policy_version,
  final_outcome, integrity_violations, recovery, cost, decision)

这里有两条反泄漏规则。第一,interceptor 只在它实际控制的平面承诺“every step”:例如声明的 browser command、CDP action 或经 proxy 的 outbound request;它不能假称看见 model 内部推理、未知 extension、native helper 或绕过该平面的 socket。第二,训练时可把 allow/block 的粗粒度安全信号作为诊断或约束,但 final evaluation 不能把隐藏规则、攻击标签或精确的安全路径反馈给 policy。否则 interceptor 会变成 answer oracle,奖励会污染评测。

因此 reward 应拆成可报告的 verified_outcomeproxy_rewardexploit_outcomeintegritycostrecovery 信号:被 block 的危险动作不是成功,合法的 HTTP 请求也不是完成。最终只有独立 postcondition 与完整性回归才能接纳一次 run。对 ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench,这是一份研究设计和验收合同,不是对已发布安全性或 RL 改善的宣告;它与Agent Evaluation Integrity中的 reward/evidence/verifier 分离,以及本文第 8 节中训练/最终接纳的双 gate 对齐。

Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB) 提供了一个多步工具任务的具体检验模式:把跳过验证、任务邻近 metadata 泄漏或评测相关篡改等捷径设为可检测事件,并分别考察独立与链式任务。若要报告 hardening_delta,必须固定任务、策略、动作面和预算,同时列出合法任务通过率与 false-block;仅看到 exploit rate 下降不是安全证明。RHB 的模型和后训练比较限于其任务与协议,不能据此决定未来 ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench 的 PPO、GRPO 或 guard 选择。

Primary References

Agent Research Environments: What Is Actually Being Measured?

Jul 2026 · AutoResearch / Eval Environments / World Models / Synthetic Training / Browser Use / Computer Use

MLS-Bench, AutoLab, EdgeBench, Terminal-Bench, SForge, and Harbor are often grouped under “agent benchmarks.” That hides the decisive differences. Some define tasks, some run tasks, some protect hidden grading, and some study how long-horizon feedback changes an artifact. They are not points on one capability ruler, and their scores should not be compared as if they were. This note extends that map in two directions: when an environment is synthesized by a world model, how to separate a plausible frame from a verifiable state transition; and when an environment is used to produce synthetic training instances, how to keep those instances executable, auditable, and transferable.

Ask four questions first: What artifact is the agent accountable for? How long is the interaction horizon? What feedback can it receive? Which verifier assigns the final score? Different answers measure different capabilities.

1. Not One Leaderboard, but a Measurement Map

Name and status Main artifact and horizon Main signal Closest inference
MLS-Bench · released benchmark An atomic ML-method component in a protected scaffold; bounded edit/test budget Constrained experiments across settings and seeds Whether a method transfers across settings rather than tunes one dataset
AutoLab · released benchmark A correct but deliberately suboptimal executable baseline; 2–12 hours Local experiments plus a sealed held-out verifier Persistent empirical optimization
EdgeBench · released, partially public An artifact improved in a realistic workspace; at least 12 hours per task Fast local feedback, submission-gated hidden judge, unobserved snapshots How environmental feedback becomes an improvement curve in one continuous run
Terminal-Bench 2.x · released benchmark An acceptable final container state in a terminal Tests inspect final state Completion of specified computer work
Terminal-Bench 3.0 · in development Preview or candidate terminal work Intended programmatic verification A goal, not released scores or a fixed task set
Terminal-Bench Science · in development Natural-science computational workflows The project requires deterministic pytest verification Reliable completion of verifiable science tasks, not open-ended discovery
SForge · harness EdgeBench work state, submissions, and traces Asynchronous structured feedback across work / judge isolation Whether long-horizon hidden evaluation is executed soundly
Harbor · harness Tasks, trials, jobs, and resulting artifacts Task-defined verifier and numeric reward Reproducible, scalable agent eval / RL rollout infrastructure
Status boundary: EdgeBench describes 134 tasks and releases its full evaluation framework, but its initial public release contains 51 tasks. The full leaderboard should not be presented as independently reproducible. TB3 and Terminal-Bench Science are both under construction; target task counts and target solve rates are plans, not achieved leaderboard facts.

2. Four Different Claims Behind “Scientific Tasks”

“Scientific task” is not one object. These four claims require different evidence:

Claim Representative environment What to inspect
Workflow completion Terminal-Bench 2.x / Terminal-Bench Science A verifiable final file, numerical result, or service state
Persistent empirical optimization AutoLab Repeated benchmarking, editing, and improvement of a known baseline within budget
Method-level generalization MLS-Bench Whether the same ML mechanism survives across settings, not scaling a model or tuning one point
Dynamics of environment learning EdgeBench How a best-so-far artifact improves from feedback across at least twelve hours

EdgeBench has 39 Scientific Problems & ML tasks. Many are open-ended and have no known optimum, but that does not mean every task lacks scoreable components. The project describes local simulators, validation, and physical constraints together with feedback from an isolated judge. Its log-sigmoid is an author-reported curve averaged across tasks, not a claim that every scientific task follows the same smooth curve.

Terminal-Bench Science sits near the opposite boundary: its call requires scientific workflows that can be checked by deterministic, pytest-based programmatic evaluation, and explicitly excludes open-ended hypothesis generation and literature review. It is designed to ask whether an agent can complete a specified scientific-computing workflow, not whether it can originate a new scientific theory.

Release Status Determines What Can Be Claimed Today

  1. EdgeBench Scientific Problems & ML. The project describes 39 science and ML tasks, but its initial public release contains four of them. Their experimental errors, constraint violations, and physical-consistency checks permit repeated feedback. The closest supported claim is therefore how an agent’s best-so-far artifact changes with environment feedback under a fixed task, harness, and time window. This does not make the full science subset a fully public, independently reproducible benchmark, nor does it establish open-ended scientific discovery.
  2. Terminal-Bench Science. Its status page currently shows zero tasks and marks the benchmark under construction. The contribution announcement sets 100+ tasks and a 10–20% solve rate as goals. Today it supports a task-contribution and deterministic-verification standard, not scientific leaderboard results. After release, its core claim will still be verifiable workflow completion rather than an environment-learning curve or hypothesis generation.
  3. Terminal-Bench 3.0. It is also under construction. Its contribution, review, and task-format guidance define a quality bar for a future terminal benchmark; before a fixed task set and official results exist, neither previews nor target numbers are comparable capability scores.
  4. Frontier Auto Research / ART. This is our proposed research scope, not a released benchmark. If it uses scientific tasks, it needs an additional research-evidence package: replayable artifacts, controls and ablations, failed attempts, a resource ledger, and transfer or replication that did not select the result. That separates “completed a workflow” or “improved along a feedback curve” from “produced a publishable empirical conclusion.”

The key question is not which task sounds more “scientific.” It is what object is held fixed, which feedback is visible, which verifier has write authority, and which release status permits an audit. See the research evidence map for sources and prohibited extrapolations.

3. SForge and Harbor Are Not Two Benchmarks

SForge is EdgeBench’s long-horizon evaluation harness. A task may have an agent-visible work image and a hidden judge image; the agent submits an archive, a Judge Server returns task-defined feedback asynchronously, and evaluation can select the best submission along a trajectory. Hidden tests, submission budgets, and the feedback protocol are part of its design.

Harbor is a more general agent harness: Dataset -> Task -> Trial -> Job. Tasks describe an instruction, environment, tests, and optionally an oracle; verifiers write reward.txt or reward.json, while agent adapters and sandboxes are replaceable. It is the official harness for Terminal-Bench 2.0, but Harbor itself makes no claim to measure “scientific ability.”

Protocol question SForge’s default orientation Harbor’s default orientation
Hidden grading Work / judge separation is central A verifier may be shared or explicitly separate
Feedback loop Multiple archive submissions, queueing, structured diagnostics, and trajectory-best selection A verifier produces trial reward; shape is chosen by the task author
Main use Observe long-horizon, feedback-driven artifact improvement General evaluation, portable trajectories, and RL rollouts

This is a protocol comparison, not a performance comparison. Without a common model, task, resources, network policy, and verifier, it is not justified to call one faster, more reliable, or “stronger.”

4. Terminal, Browser Use, and Computer Use: Interface Boundaries Also Change Measurement

Interface Where real state lives What an action establishes How to verify
Terminal / scientific computing Container filesystem, processes, and kernels A command ran; stdout and exit status can be recorded Pin inputs, record image digests, test, and rerun artifacts
Browser Use Pages, cookies, tabs, and remote services A click or fill interaction was deliverable A receipt, record ID, user-visible status, or safe read-only backend check
Computer Use GUI, windows, desktop apps, and their backing state A screenshot-driven mouse or keyboard action executed Re-observe and prefer a deterministic end-state assertion

Browser Use is not “a terminal with buttons.” It can retain sessions, cookies, and tabs, and can work through CDP, page inspection, JavaScript, or screenshots. Interface traces need not reveal the full business state on the server. Playwright checks that an element is visible, stable, event-receiving, and enabled before clicking; that still does not prove an order was created or an email was sent.

Computer Use has a broader boundary. With OpenAI’s computer tool, for example, the model receives screenshots, returns mouse and keyboard actions, and then observes a new screenshot. It can drive a browser, VM, or desktop-style harness. Each cycle also carries inference, rendering, screenshot-transfer, and visual-token cost. The distinction should not be reduced to “vision versus DOM”; it is primarily a general computer execution environment versus a browser runtime.

Safety boundary: webpage and screen content are untrusted input. For authentication, payments, permission changes, sending, deleting, or other irreversible actions, use isolated sessions, domain and action allowlists, end-state verification, and human confirmation at the point of risk. A final screenshot is evidence, not a guarantee that a transaction succeeded.

For the full comparison of task substrate, reset, interface, verifier, and comparable profiles across self-hosted web, enterprise web, live web, desktop, and mobile settings, see Web-Agent Environments. Do not pool their success rates into a single “general GUI” score.

5. World Models as Environments: From Plausible Frames to Verifiable State Transitions

When a generative world model is used to synthesize task environments, “world model” ends up naming four different objects — a predictor, a video or simulator, an embodied task environment, and internal state maintained for planning. For RSI, Auto Research, long-horizon work, RL environments, and synthetic-instance training, the important question is not how realistic a frame looks. It is which action is allowed in which state, what it changes, how failure occurs, how recovery works, and who independently checks the final state.

Central claim: visual plausibility != interactive utility != correct state transition != verified outcome. Only after separating these four layers can a world model become a trainable, auditable, falsifiable environment rather than a coherent-looking rollout.

5.1 Separate Four Objects That Are Often Collapsed

Object Question it answers Narrow conclusion it can support What it cannot establish
World representation / predictor How do a next observation, latent state, or uncertainty change under an action? Prediction error or calibration can be measured for a stated distribution and action condition The model understands causal reality or can reliably control a real system
Generative simulation Can it generate apparently continuous images, video, or sensor trajectories? Perceptual presentation can be compared Visual realism makes action semantics or postconditions correct
Executable environment How do initial state, actions, transitions, errors, and reset run? Tasks on a stated interface can be replayed, trained on, and verified The environment is loophole-free, distributionally complete, or reward-hack-proof
Agent-maintained state How does an agent remember actions, object state, and unresolved constraints? State reconstruction, retrieval, and recovery can be measured independently Memory implies long-horizon planning or reliable execution

WorldArena directly compares perceptual quality and functional interactive utility in one evaluation frame. Its follow-up, WorldArena 2.0, extends the setting toward visuotactile and interactive-RL evaluation. These preprints support a simple but important design rule: report visual quality and interactive utility separately; do not let the former vouch for the latter.

5.2 From “Does It Look Right?” to “Can It Do the Right Thing?”: Four Acceptance Layers

WorldArena organizes perceptual, functional, and action-planning evaluation for interactive embodied world models, emphasizing that visual performance and useful interaction may diverge. iWorld-Bench centers interaction and separates several task types for action-conditioned world modeling. Their shared value is not a universal ranking, but a demand that evaluators name the layer they are measuring.

Acceptance layer Observable metric Required counterexample Insufficient evidence
Presentation / perception Does a visual, tactile, or textual observation match a reference? The frame is correct while hidden backend state is wrong Smooth video, similar screenshot, or subjective realism
Action-conditioned prediction Given (state, action), are the next observation and state change accurate and calibrated? A plausible prediction whose critical postcondition fails Unconditioned generation quality or average pixel score
Interactive / policy utility Does a fixed policy have consistent verified success, errors, and recovery in simulation and a target environment? It succeeds in simulation and fails in an independent or target environment One rollout or unchecked action success
Terminal acceptance Does an independent verifier confirm the physical or business postcondition? UI says done but no request committed; endpoint arrived with a wrong payload Final text, toast, URL, or screenshot from the agent

For web, terminal, scientific, or computer-use environments, the last layer is often more direct than appearance: did an order actually write, is a file and its test output correct, can an experiment artifact rerun, or does a device meet its specification? Rendering can be an observation; it is not ground truth. Turning “a high visual score” into “a reliable environment” is an unsupported leap unless a verifier closes that gap.

5.3 The Contract of a Trainable Environment

A training environment should version these objects separately instead of hiding rules in a prompt, page script, or a single reward number:

TaskManifest  = goal, initial_state_digest, allowed_actions, budget, seed
Observe        = state -> observation + observation_provenance
Act            = (state, authorized_action) -> transition_event | rejected_action
Transition     = (state, action, exogenous_event) -> next_state + side_effect_digest
Reset          = task_id, seed -> initial_state + reset_evidence
Verify         = hidden_postcondition(next_state, evidence) -> outcome + diagnostics
Recover        = checkpoint, failure -> restored_state | safe_stop

This contract has seven practical consequences:

  1. Initial state is data, not scenery. Record the image/database/VM digest, account or fixture, seed, and reset evidence for every run.
  2. Action authority precedes the action space. A schema says what an agent can express; a capability grant says whether it may currently read, write, call an external service, or create an irreversible side effect.
  3. Transitions need verifiable consequences. A successful action return does not substitute for a backend write, persisted file, changed object state, or failure branch.
  4. Observation is not truth. A DOM, screen, tool response, and agent memory can be stale, injected, or incomplete; preserve provenance and visibility scope.
  5. Separate reward from verifier. Reward may be a learning signal. Final acceptance still belongs to a verifier and hidden postcondition the agent cannot write.
  6. Measure reset and recovery separately. Reset restores a standard initial state; recovery handles interruption, error, or partial side effect while retaining evidence. Neither is a chat-summary problem.
  7. A trace is evidence, not a verdict. Log actions, interceptions, state changes, cost, checkpoints, and artifact hashes, then let an independent verifier decide the terminal state.

OSWorld combines executable computer environments, VM snapshots, and execution evaluation, an early concrete form of this contract. EnvFactory and Agentick make environment/task synthesis and verifiable task construction into systems questions. They do not make any environment inherently safe or clean, but they show that task, state, execution, and verification need to be engineered together.

5.4 A Synthetic World Is Not Synthetic Copy: Isolate the Generator Too

When synthetic instances are used for training, the most dangerous reduction is to generate only task instructions or successful trajectories. A training-useful synthetic instance needs at least:

Instance part Minimum requirement What it protects
Initial state and role Snapshot/fixture, identity, seed, boundary between visible and hidden information Prevents memorizing one answer from a template
State machine Preconditions, authorized actions, transitions, failure branches, terminal conditions Prevents rewarding one ideal trajectory only
Observations and evidence Provenance and time for DOM/screen/tool/file/database observations Prevents treating visible appearance as true state
Verifier Independent postcondition, audit inputs, version/hash, diagnostics Prevents the policy from rewriting or guessing a reward shortcut
Lineage and split Generator, prompt/template, source, version, training membership, evaluation exclusion Prevents generator, rules, or successful traces leaking into a holdout

Agent World Model proposes synthetic tool environments backed by code and databases. Its reported results occur in its own defined environments and evaluations, so it supports the claim that executable, stateful synthetic environments are a viable research object, not that automatically generated worlds naturally cover a real tool ecosystem. Agent-World, which discovers and expands tasks from database/tool environments, should likewise be read by its stated task, tool, training, and evaluation distribution.

Thus training and evaluation need at least four separations: environment, workflow/rule, generator/template family, and evaluator/security family. When a generator has seen verifier logic, successful evaluation traces, or the only state template, a final score is no longer clean transfer evidence even if task names differ. Section 8 develops instance lineage, SFT/RL controls, and the split protocol in full.

5.5 Long Horizon Is Not Longer Video: It Is Recoverable State

WorldLines constructs memory-QA and embodied-planning samples from extended household traces containing dialogue, actions, execution feedback, and object/device state changes. It exposes challenges from partial observability, overwritten state, and converting memory into action plans. LongAct studies dependencies, memory, and adaptive planning in free-form household tasks. Their direct lesson is that a long-horizon environment must confront an agent with state change, not repackage every step as an independent question.

A minimal long-horizon evaluation should report:

  • State reconstruction: after interruption, can the system recover committed/uncommitted work, resources, and constraints without revealing hidden truth?
  • Uncertainty and visibility: does it know that an object or state is unseen, stale, or overwritten?
  • Failure recovery: after tool error, network failure, concurrent write, or partial commit, does it retry, rollback, escalate, or safely stop?
  • Verified completion: does the terminal postcondition hold, rather than merely exhausting the episode or sounding confident?
  • Cost of recovery: what tokens, tool calls, wall-clock time, and additional side effects did recovery require?

This is the connection between a world model and a long-horizon harness: an internal prediction or memory is useful only if it helps the system recover correctly under overwritten state, partial observation, and action feedback. See Long-Horizon Agents for the fuller checkpoint, fault-injection, and acceptance protocol, and Agent Memory for a separate protocol for context, events, retrieval, execution state, and a memory trust boundary.

5.6 Foundation World Models Is a Research Agenda, Not a Validated System Guarantee

Foundation World Models offers a useful research agenda: derive reward from specifications, check constraints with formal verification, calibrate abstractions online, and synthesize models or environments at test time. It is a strong way to enumerate variables, not a general capability or safety guarantee already established by experiments.

To turn that agenda into falsifiable experiments, separate at least these questions:

Initiative Testable implementation Observation that falsifies or narrows it
Specification-derived reward Intermediate signals derived from a declared postcondition and reported separately from an independent terminal state Reward rises while hidden verification does not, or a policy tampers with reward inputs
Formal constraints Executable checks over action, resources, and state invariants Constraints cover only ideal paths while failure branches still overreach or cause wrong side effects
Online calibration Confidence, mismatch detection, and when the system requests observation or safely stops High-confidence errors, unrecognized OOD states, or calibration only on development environments
Test-time synthesis Generate helper models/environments outside a frozen holdout and record provenance Generator sees final rules, hidden evaluator, or successful traces and leaks evaluation

The boundary matters especially for Auto Research and RSI: a system may propose or synthesize a better research or environment artifact, but the candidate must not write acceptance, policy, or credentials. An apparently realistic world model does not replace an independent evaluator.

5.7 A Small but Sharp Evaluation Matrix

To compare static data, a visual world model, an executable environment, and agent-maintained state, hold base model, harness, action authority, total tokens, wall-clock time, training-data budget, and hidden evaluator fixed. Add these paired counterexamples:

Control What to measure Informative failure
Static trace vs executable transition Verified success, replay, OOD transition error Repeats successful traces but cannot handle valid unseen state changes
Visually plausible vs state-correct simulator Action-conditioned accuracy, postcondition violations Looks right but submits to the wrong object, writes a wrong field, or changes a wrong device
Reward-only vs independent verifier Reward/verified-success gap, tampering, false acceptance Score is high but backend does not change, or the agent rewrites evidence/scoring inputs
No memory vs recoverable state Reconstruction, recovery, rollback, safe stopping A plausible summary omits committed work or an old constraint
Synthetic training vs split-isolated evaluation Environment/workflow/template/security-family transfer Gain vanishes after changing the generator, rules, or evaluator

Do not report a pass rate alone. At minimum, also report transition violations; error, refusal, and recovery categories; interception or authority violations; uncertainty calibration; trace completeness; cost per verified success; and variance across seeds and tasks. For browser/computer tasks with real side effects, explicitly name the control plane and sidecar evidence; see Agent Tool Governance.

5.8 Return to the Five Core Research Threads

Core thread New measurable object from world models / environments What it cannot replace
RSI / OpenRSI Editable state/harness/world artifact, cross-generation transition regression, non-writable acceptance Evidence that an improver keeps improving on independent holdouts
Auto Research / ART Research state, experimental transitions, failure branches, replayable postconditions Causal validity, controls, limitations, and peer scrutiny
Long horizon Visibility, state lineage, checkpoints, recovery, and safe stop A capability claim merely because an episode is longer
ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench Self-hosted snapshot, authorized actions, backend state, independent verifier Browser imagery, click trace, or endpoint success alone
Synthetic training / Agentic RL Executable instances, transition coverage, generator provenance, split-isolated transfer A batch of synthetic text or a higher development-set reward

The conclusion is simple but constraining: a world model should not give an environment a prettier surface. It should make state, transition, observation, authority, recovery, and acceptance definable, intervenable, and falsifiable. That is what lets it serve RL training, long-horizon execution, synthetic data, and research agents without letting “looks real” quietly replace “independently verified as correct.”

6. How We Can Differentiate: Evidence-Preserving Research Agency

The research position here is not to create one more benchmark that collapses every task into a score. It is to study evidence-preserving research agency: an agent demonstrates a level of research capability only to the extent that it produces a reusable artifact, improves it with empirical feedback, survives held-out transfer, and reproduces under a controlled rerun.

That can be an executable research protocol:

  1. Use Harbor-style task, artifact, and trajectory records for replayability.
  2. Start from an AutoLab-style valid baseline and report relative quality gain rather than only an absolute score.
  3. Use MLS-Bench-style protected edit surfaces and held-out settings to test method generalization.
  4. Record EdgeBench-style local and judge feedback timelines to show when and why meaningful improvement occurred.
  5. Report a four-dimensional profile: completion rate, relative quality gain, held-out transfer, and time to first reliable improvement / rerun consistency.

This is a proposed research methodology, not a performance claim for a released system. Its value is to make “can do research” a set of falsifiable evidence rather than a vague label.

7. An Evaluation Environment Is Also a Training Substrate, but Keep Three Distributions Separate

When an environment supports synthetic instances, agentic RL, or continual adaptation, it is no longer only a one-shot evaluator; it is also a training substrate. The easiest mistake is to let the task generator, training rollouts, and final verifier share the same answer channel. Keep three distributions explicitly separate instead.

Agentick illustrates that procedurally generated tasks, a Gym-compatible interface, reference policies, and pre-built training data can share a sequential-decision framework; it does not establish that synthetic tasks are realistic enough. OSWorld illustrates how initial-state configuration and execution-based evaluation can make real computer tasks repeatable; it does not make a GUI screenshot a substitute for end-state verification. ACuRL links target-environment exploration, curriculum synthesis, and continual adaptation; its scoped result does not permit training data and the final benchmark to be mixed. Together with the detectable vulnerability opportunities in Hack-Verifiable Environments, these sources suggest a minimum boundary for a trainable environment.

Distribution What it may contain What it must never lend to another side
Experience / training Resettable sites or VMs, provenance-tracked synthetic instances, execution traces, visible feedback, and curricula Final tasks, hidden rules, successful traces, or evaluator implementation
Evaluation Frozen initial states, independent verifiers, and holdouts separated by site, workflow, and rule Answers, templates, or reward shortcuts used to generate or filter training instances
Integrity / adversarial Injections, wrong payloads, UI/backend mismatches, and detectable reward-hacking opportunities Hidden judges, privileged credentials, or model-specific answer keys exposed to the agent

“Learning” Must Name Its Update Channel

“An agent learns from an environment” is not one technical fact. It can refer to at least the four distinct updates below. A report must name the object that changed; a positive result in one channel cannot be silently promoted into a conclusion about another.

Update channel Object actually updated Representative evidence and minimum disclosure What it cannot be promoted into
Within-run artifact search Code, configuration, workspace, or a best-so-far artifact around a fixed agent AutoLab, EdgeBench: pinned agent/harness version, full artifact lineage, feedback timeline, and equal-budget curves The base model or policy parameters learned, or the result transfers automatically beyond the task
State / skill evolution with a frozen policy Prompts, playbooks, external skills, and meta-skills while the backbone remains fixed RSEA, MetaSkill-Evolve: frozen backbone, state versions, development/holdout gate, and rollback RL training occurred, or model weights and evaluator recursively improved
Policy / parameter training Policy, adapter, or model parameters, together with the rollout distribution that updates them ACuRL, Agentick: base/final checkpoint, behavior policy, reward, rollouts, training data, and an independent evaluation split General continual learning in any new environment, or RSI merely because training occurred
Cross-generation improvement mechanism The operator, harness, or skill pipeline that proposes, selects, and accepts next-generation changes Fixed editable surface, equal-resource next-generation held-out gain, rejected branches, integrity, and rollback; see RSI Strong RSI from one improved skill, artifact, or training run

The absence of base-model updates does not make “environment learning” invalid: when the improved object is explicitly an artifact, a within-run feedback curve is still useful evidence. This taxonomy only forbids silent movement between update channels. For the proposed ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench, state, skills, policy checkpoints, and environment artifacts may all be studied, but each must be versioned, receive isolated training/acceptance data, and be reported separately.

Accordingly, a trainable environment should version five contracts: reset, observe, act, verify, and evidence. Each synthetic instance needs its generator, initial state, execution verifier, source/license review, deduplication record, and split provenance. Accept a training result only through equal-budget SFT-only, RL-only, and SFT+RL controls on tasks held out by environment, workflow, and rule. Otherwise, “synthetic instances made a foundation model better” may only mean that it learned a shortcut near its generator.

This does not turn every benchmark into one huge training ground. It requires only that when an evaluation environment is used for training, evaluation integrity, data lineage, and anti-gaming regressions become first-class objects. As in RSI’s candidate/acceptance separation, a training agent cannot be able to write the final verifier or its evidence channel. The connected choices for memory, MCP, safety, and skills appear in the hot agent directions map; for reward, evidence, verifier, judge, acceptance, and anti-gaming regressions, see Agent Evaluation Integrity; for state transitions, visual-versus-functional evaluation, and independent terminal acceptance, see Section 5 above; for runtime authority, sidecar evidence, and adversarial acceptance over MCP and browser/computer tools, see Agent Tool Governance. The next section takes up that synthetic-instance path in detail.

8. Synthetic Instances for Agent Training: Executable, Auditable, Transferable

“Generate 2K synthetic instances” is not a training result; it is only a scale hypothesis. For agents that use tools, web pages, terminals, or GUIs, a useful instance is not a prompt-answer row. It is an executable, verifiable, traceable micro-environment: it specifies the initial state, available actions, observed trajectory, successful terminal state, and why the data did not leak the answer to final evaluation.

Central claim: report synthetic-data scale, effectiveness, and safety separately. First show that instances execute and verify independently. Then report their coverage and diversity. Only then test transfer on unseen tasks with environment, workflow, rule, and verifier separation. Without the third step, “training got better” usually describes a distribution close to the generator.

8.1 What a Synthetic Instance Must Contain

For an agent, the minimum training record is not a text pair but the following versioned object:

Field What to retain Failure without it
Intent User goal, constraints, and permitted completion range The model learns an over-specified operation sequence
Initial state Environment image, database/files/browser profile, account template, and random seed The run cannot be replayed or shown to start from the same problem
Action surface Tool schema, authority, network, and side-effect policy A training trace may use unavailable or unauthorized test-time tools
Outcome and evidence Independent verifier, final artifact, backend postcondition, trace, and artifact hash Language self-assessment or a screenshot substitutes for completion
Provenance Generator/model/prompt/source, license and sensitive-data review, deduplication, and split label Leakage, copyright, privacy, or template memorization cannot be audited

This is why “more dialogue” does not mean “more agent data.” Without initial state, action semantics, and an independent terminal state, a trajectory is hard to use as a reliable SFT demonstration or outcome-RL rollout.

8.2 Four Synthesis Routes, Four Different Risks

AgentTrek uses web tutorials as guidance, turns textual steps into GUI goals, and attempts execution and evaluation in real digital environments. It shows that guided replay can scale GUI trajectories; it does not make tutorial text automatically trainable, licensed, or separated from evaluation.

EnvFactory takes a different route: it explores and verifies stateful executable tool environments from authentic resources, then synthesizes natural multi-turn trajectories with topology-aware sampling. Its contribution is joining environment construction and trajectory synthesis; its benchmark-specific gains do not automatically transfer to web, GUI, or arbitrary tool protocols.

Agentick represents a third route: procedural tasks, a shared Gym interface, and reference policies make different agent paradigms comparable. Reinforcement Learning Foundation Models Should Already Be A Thing further proposes pretraining an RL foundation model from a synthetic MDP prior and gives a proof of concept on held-out tabular MDPs. These routes help control the generation distribution, but do not by themselves preserve the semantics, authority, or user intent of real workflows.

In coding environments, SWE-Gym packages a natural-language task, codebase, executable runtime, and unit tests into a training instance. R2E-Gym scales executable environments by constructing tests from commits and back-translating task descriptions, while analyzing the complementary strengths and limits of execution-based and execution-free verifiers. Together they show that having a runnable test does not settle every verification question: environment construction, training-data admission, and final transfer acceptance still need separate records.

Selection rule: tutorials or web sources can supply natural intent; executable environments supply transitions and verifiers; procedural generation supplies coverage control; code-and-test instances supply replayable terminal states. A mature pipeline can combine them, but must record how each layer changes the data distribution rather than call unlike evidence sources “real data.”

8.3 Scale Is Not the Only Axis: Diversity and Executability Come Before Row Count

Beyond Quantity: Trajectory Diversity Scaling reports that, in its fixed-budget code-agent setting, raising trajectory diversity was more valuable than merely increasing count. That supports measuring coverage, long tails, and action complexity during selection; it is not a law that diversity always beats quantity in every domain.

A “2K” plan should therefore publish an instance dashboard before its count:

  1. Executability: Can it replay from a frozen initial state; does its verifier pass; are failures environmental flakiness or agent behavior?
  2. Structural diversity: Coverage of sites/tool graphs, goal types, initial states, authority, failure recovery, and action topology, not only embedding distance.
  3. Semantic diversity: Whether intents are template rewrites, and whether they include implicit subgoals, conflicting constraints, and tasks requiring stop or refusal.
  4. Integrity: Whether answer text, hidden rules, successful traces, evaluator code, or searchable near-duplicates of evaluation data appear.
  5. Cost and risk: Generation, replay, judging, human review, license/privacy review, and blocked dangerous actions.

8.4 Coverage Cells Are More Auditable Than “Random Diversity”

Diversity cannot be only a claim that embedding distance is larger. EnvFactory connects environment topology to multi-turn trajectory synthesis; SWE-Gym and R2E-Gym place executable runtime, task construction, and verifier inside an instance definition. Across these different objects, the following is a sampling protocol proposed here, not a universal result claim about any paper.

CoverageCell(
  environment_family, workflow_or_rule, initial_state_class,
  action_topology, authority_class, failure_or_recovery_mode,
  verifier_family, source_lineage_cluster, split)

CoverageManifest(
  cell_quotas, minimum_tail_quota, accepted_and_rejected_counts,
  replay_and_integrity_rates, near_duplicate_policy,
  heldout_exclusion_rule, allocation_version)
Coverage axis What each instance must label Coverage / quality signal to publish What cannot substitute for it
Environment and workflow Site/repository/tool schema, rule family, and final split Accepted/rejected counts for each environment-workflow cell and held-out exclusion Only a domain label or total instance count
State and action Initial-state class, action topology, read/write or irreversible action, and observation mode Per-cell replay, completion, duplicate-side-effect, and action-length distributions Embedding diversity or one successful trace
Recovery and safety Explicit failure, silent failure, conflict, injection, refusal, and safe-stop modes Fault/safety-cell coverage, false blocks, recovery, and uncovered attack surfaces Training only smooth successful trajectories
Evidence and verifier Verifier family, visible feedback, hidden postcondition, and evidence source Verifier distinguishability, integrity violations, and replay stability Folding judge score, test result, and final acceptance into one signal
Lineage and semantics Generator/source/template/intent cluster, license/PII review, and deduplication cluster Cluster entropy, near-duplicate rate, and cross-cluster split overlap Deduplicating prompt text alone

For a 2K budget, first freeze the final holdout’s environment, workflow/rule, verifier, and source-exclusion axes. Then preregister a minimum tail quota for training cells instead of adding data to “effective” templates after seeing final results. Preserve accepted/rejected ratios and rejection reasons for every cell: empty cells, over-concentrated cells, and cells rejected for safety or replay failure are all data results. When a cell has no admissible instance, report uncovered rather than silently filling it with a neighboring template.

Only when accepted and rejected instances remain queryable with these measures does 2K become an auditable data target rather than a promotional number.

8.5 Admit Instances Before Accepting Training Results: Two Gates Must Not Share One Success Score

Whether a trajectory may enter a training set and whether a training run may claim transfer are different decisions. The first audits a data object; the second audits an experimental claim. A verifier-passing trace may still be templated, near-duplicated, or leak a final task, while a training run may improve only on development data. One successful trace, one reward, or one judge therefore cannot be the sole basis for both gates.

Gate What it decides What admission must retain Typical rejection condition
Instance admission Whether a candidate instance/trace enters the training pool Frozen initial state and replay record; independent outcome evidence; verifier and integrity results; authority check; source/license/PII review; deduplication hash and split label It cannot replay reliably; it bypasses the verifier; it has unauthorized side effects; source/privacy is unclear; it is near-duplicate to a held-out environment, workflow, or evidence item
Training-result acceptance Whether an SFT, RL, or SFT+RL run may claim held-out transfer Base model, harness, tools, data manifest, budget, and candidate-selection rule; outcome, integrity, recovery, cost, and transfer records from an independent final suite It reports only training/development scores; the final suite was selected adaptively; gain came from stronger tools or more budget; success co-occurs with regression, leakage, or integrity violations

The two records should be independently queryable, replayable, and revocable:

InstanceAdmission(instance_hash, source_state, replay_result,
  outcome_evidence, integrity_result, provenance_review,
  split_label, decision)

TrainingAcceptance(run_hash, base_and_harness, method, data_manifest,
  budget, evaluator_version, holdout_suite, outcome, integrity,
  recovery, cost, transfer, decision)

Instance admission may use a training-side verifier as one piece of evidence. Training-result acceptance must occur again on a frozen, isolated final suite. This dual record makes both “why was this data included?” and “why should we believe this transfer result?” auditable, while allowing failure on either side to veto an over-broad claim.

8.6 SFT, RL, and SFT+RL: Compare Learning Signals, Not Algorithm Slogans

SFT can teach a policy to imitate verifier-passing action sequences. Outcome RL instead favors trajectories that complete an environment even when they differ from a demonstration. Both can fail: SFT inherits teacher redundancy and templates; RL can amplify verifier gaps, sparse reward, or useless exploration.

SFT Memorizes, RL Generalizes finds, in its controlled textual-rule and visual environments, that outcome-based RL generalizes better to unseen variants than SFT alone, while SFT still helps stabilize RL output format. It is an important experimental-design signal, not evidence that RL beats SFT in every agent environment.

Condition Training data and signal Minimum fair control Additional check required
SFT-only Verifier-passing traces with action/observation sequences Same base model, training tokens, and training environment as other conditions Does imitation merely reproduce a success template?
RL-only Online or offline rollouts with an independent outcome reward Same action surface, rollout budget, stop rule, and safety policy Is reward sparse, gameable, or valid only at training initial states?
SFT+RL Verifiable trajectories establish format/tool priors, then outcome optimization Report data, budget, checkpoints, and selection rule for each phase Can the SFT contribution, RL gain, and interaction be ablated?

If a comparison changes harness, available tools, browser profile, verifier, concurrency, or token budget, it no longer compares only training methods. It compares different agent systems.

8.7 Four Separations: Do Not Let Generator, Search, and Evaluator Share Answers

Training/evaluation splitting cannot be a random row split. Agent tasks need at least four separations:

Separation surface Visible on training side Final evaluation must keep different
Environment Sites, VM images, services, or database snapshots New sites, independent images, or non-overlapping backend state
Workflow / rule Seen tool graphs, business rules, and verifier patterns New tool combinations, constraints, failures, and postconditions
Evidence Sources and execution logs required for synthesis Hidden tests, successful traces, answer/metadata, and evaluator implementation
Search Retrieval corpus permitted for collection Benchmark, question context, or labels cannot be retrieved at evaluation time

Search-Time Contamination in Deep Research Agents shows that even when model weights did not contain a benchmark, test-time web retrieval can surface question context or answers and inflate a score. Synthetic agent-data generation and evaluation both need logged retrieval sources, blocked domains, and similarity audits; otherwise “unseen” can mean only a different filename.

Integrity tasks should also contain detectable reward-hacking opportunities. Hack-Verifiable Environments makes such exploitation an automatically scored outcome. Higher task success accompanied by higher integrity violations is not a training improvement.

8.8 A 2K-Instance Protocol That Can Fail

This is a research design for synthetic-instance foundation-model training, not a completed dataset or reported training result:

  1. Start with a small pilot and instance admission. Execute each candidate instance from a frozen state, retaining generation, execution, verifier, and failure records. Only candidates passing provenance, replay, authority, and integrity checks enter the accepted pool.
  2. Freeze distributions. Declare the environment, workflow, rule, evidence, and search split before training; the generator cannot see final tasks or an evaluator’s answer channel.
  3. Sample by coverage. At fixed token and environment budget, fill long tails in action topology, recovery patterns, stopping/refusal, authority, and initial state rather than duplicate high-scoring templates.
  4. Train three conditions. SFT-only, RL-only, and SFT+RL use the same base model, environment, tools, and total resource budget, retaining every checkpoint and failed rollout.
  5. Then accept training results. On isolated final states, a verifier outside the agent’s write authority measures outcome, integrity violation, cost per verified success, recovery, and cross-environment transfer; a language judge’s single preference is not final ground truth.

ACuRL connects environment exploration, ability-related curriculum synthesis, and continual adaptation, showing how target-environment experience can become a data source. It also reinforces why adaptive curricula must remain separate from final evaluation: otherwise the agent keeps tracking the same test distribution.

8.9 How It Returns to the Core Five

Core thread What synthetic training must provide What synthetic training cannot replace
RSI / OpenRSI Training and regression evidence for versioned skill/harness edits Independent acceptance gates and cross-generation held-out curves
Auto Research / ART Replayable instances, controls, failures, and resource ledgers Research novelty, causal explanation, and peer review
Long horizon Trajectories carrying checkpoints, recovery, state changes, and cost Independent validation of real hours-long runs
ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench Self-hosted initial states, actions, backend postconditions, and safety regressions Open authority or secrets from real external services
Foundation-model training Auditable SFT/RL experience and OOD transfer tests A narrative that larger scale is necessarily better

This returns the five lines to one simple principle: the environment defines what can be learned, the verifier defines completion, and separation defines which results deserve belief. See AutoResearch for candidate freezing and independent reruns; Agent Evaluation Integrity for why reward, evidence, verifier, and acceptance cannot impersonate one another; Agentic RL for real-harness reward and trajectories; Agent Memory for stateful instances, memory operations, schema/provenance splits, and a memory trust boundary; Agent Skills for skill-aware data and controlled revision; and the hot agent directions map for adjacent choices in memory, MCP, and safety.

9. Intercepting Every Step Does Not Mean Rewarding Every Step

For the proposed self-hosted ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench environment, “intercept every step” should mean pre-commit authority control, not an ambiguous process reward. ClawBench’s public trace bundle separately retains recording.mp4, requests.jsonl, actions.jsonl, agent-messages.jsonl, interception.json, and run metadata. This demonstrates that browser actions, network requests, agent messages, and interception decisions can be recorded separately; it does not show that those records exhaust every browser, operating-system, or server-side effect.

BrowseSafe shows that prompt injection in realistic HTML can influence a browser agent’s real actions. WASP evaluates web-agent hijacking in an isolated environment. Together they support placing injections, wrong payloads, and UI/backend mismatches in an integrity distribution, rather than folding a security screen into a final score and assuming that risk is solved.

Stage Object not writable by the agent Allowed decision What it must not impersonate
Observe observation_ref, provenance/trust label, pre-state digest Provide bounded observations Page text is not verifier instruction or an authority grant
Propose proposed_action, declared objective, expected side effect The agent proposes an action within a restricted schema A proposal is not an action that occurred
Intercept Authority policy, domain/action allowlist, block/ask/allow reason Allow, block, redact, or request human confirmation before commitment Interception must not reveal the hidden judge, answer, or correct next step
Commit Mediated action, external receipt, post-state digest Execute through the controlled browser/CDP/proxy/VM plane HTTP 200, a DOM change, or a screenshot is not user-goal completion
Evidence Append-only sidecar trace, artifact/receipt hash Preserve auditable facts Agent self-report or rewritable logs are not independent evidence
Verify / accept Agent-nonwritable final verifier, integrity suite, budget ledger Decide terminal state, violations, recovery, and cost Reward, one block, or judge preference is not final acceptance

A minimal versioned record can be:

StepRecord(run_id, step_id, pre_state_digest, observation_ref,
  proposed_action, declared_intent, authority_decision,
  interception_reason, commit_receipt, post_state_digest,
  evidence_refs, integrity_label)

RunAcceptance(run_id, task_manifest, harness_and_policy_version,
  final_outcome, integrity_violations, recovery, cost, decision)

Two anti-leakage rules matter here. First, an interceptor promises “every step” only on the plane it actually controls, such as declared browser commands, CDP actions, or outbound requests that cross a proxy. It must not claim visibility into model-internal reasoning, unknown extensions, native helpers, or sockets bypassing that plane. Second, training may use coarse allow/block safety signals as diagnostics or constraints, but final evaluation must not feed hidden rules, attack labels, or an exact safe path back to the policy. Otherwise the interceptor becomes an answer oracle and the reward contaminates evaluation.

Report reward as separate verified_outcome, proxy_reward, exploit_outcome, integrity, cost, and recovery signals: a blocked dangerous action is not success, and a legal HTTP request is not completion. Only an independent postcondition and integrity regression may accept a run. For ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench, this is a research design and acceptance contract, not a claim of released security or RL improvement. It aligns with the reward/evidence/verifier separation in Agent Evaluation Integrity and the training/final-acceptance dual gate in Section 8 above.

Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB) gives a concrete multi-step tool-task pattern: make shortcuts such as skipped validation, task-adjacent metadata leakage, or evaluation-relevant tampering detectable, then test independent and chained tasks separately. To report hardening_delta, hold task, policy, action surface, and budget fixed, and report legitimate-task pass rate and false blocks too; a lower exploit rate alone is not a safety proof. RHB’s model and post-training comparisons are scoped to its tasks and protocol, so they do not decide PPO, GRPO, or guard choices for future ClawBench V2 / WebsiteBench work.

Primary References

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